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INTRODUCTION
The important topic of stewardship is belatedly coming to the forefront
of the corporate governance debate. This is a positive development, because
it is long past due for a serious consideration of the obligations institutional
investors owe to their investors and society.
For far too long, corporate governance commentators have ignored the
separation of ownership from ownership1 and the reality that institutional
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investors, and therefore marginal traders and daily stock prices, have gained
enormous power over our public companies and thus our economies. This
has been true in the U.S. for some time, but is also becoming a trend
throughout the OECD.2
In this article I spell out my view of what it takes for stewardship to be
a meaningful concept in our 21st Century economy. The article will also
address why any serious effort to rebalance our corporate governance system
and tackle growing economic insecurity and inequality must include
regulating the power of all classes of institutional investors: pension funds,
mutual funds, and hedge funds.
Put simply, this regulation must make institutional investors do what is
required of any faithful fiduciary and any good citizen of a republic — take
seriously their own obligations of fidelity by aligning their conduct with the
real interests of those whose capital they hold and by making money for
themselves in a way that does not cause societal harm.
For many years, stewardship has been more a name for the investment
industry blaming those who manage real companies for every problem, when
as a matter of linguistics, stewardship requires something more inward and
responsibility-accepting. True stewardship involves undertaking meaningful
obligations yourself. In this context, it requires coherent investing,
engagement, and voting policies that emphasize sustainable growth, and
recognize that human investors need — as an economic matter — companies
to pay workers fair wages and treat them with respect, to avoid externalizing
costs to other companies, taxpayers, and consumers, and to be
environmentally responsible. This does not involve talk and inconsistent
walk. It requires discipline and focus.
The article also explains what a positive move toward genuine
stewardship of this kind could mean now that a new Administration
committed to making our economy function more fairly is in power, and why
673, 687 (2005); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Human Freedom and Two Friedmen: Musings on the
Implications of Globalization for the Effective Regulation of Corporate Behaviour, 58 U.
TORONTO L. J. 241, 262 (2008).
2. See European Commission, Study on Directors’ Duties and Sustainable Corporate
Governance (July 2020), https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/e47928a2d20b-11ea-adf7-01aa75ed71a1/language-en [https://perma.cc/92Y5-5BVA]
Evidence collected over the 1992-2018 period shows that there is a trend for
publicly listed companies within the EU to focus on short-term benefits of
shareholders rather than on the long-term interests of the company. Data indicate
an upward trend in shareholder pay-outs, which increased fourfold, from less than
1% of revenues in 1992 to almost 4% in 2018. Moreover, the ratio of CAPEX
and R&D investment to revenues has been declining since the beginning of the
21st century.
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this movement is vital to creating an economic system that works for all.
To frame these recommendations, the article first identifies the
differences between today’s corporate governance system and the system
that existed when most of our key regulatory structures addressing
institutional investors were created. The article then touches on the
unsatisfactory outcomes that have resulted during the last forty years when
the power of institutional investors and the stock market over American
public companies grew enormously, and the protections for other
stakeholders, particularly workers, shrunk substantially. After that, the
article discusses why trusting the institutional investor community to reform
itself is not an adequate answer to channeling its conduct to be more
consistent with the best interests of our society and of diversified worker
investors. Finally, the article concludes with what a sensible framework for
updated industry regulation might look like, emphasizing that this reform,
while essential to restoring greater economic equality and fairness, is not
sufficient in itself.
I.

NOT YOUR GRANDFATHER’S: THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
SYSTEM WE NOW HAVE

Any effective initiative to improve institutional investor stewardship
must be grounded on a recognition of the profoundly different corporate
governance system we now have, and how it has outgrown the regulatory
structure in which it functions.
As I have noted elsewhere,3 much of the current regulatory structure for
our corporate governance system reflected some implicit assumptions,
including that:
• stockholders had a long-term stake in the company’s best interests;
most stockholders were affluent and owned their shares directly, for
their own benefit, and held them for lengthy periods;
• the stockholders who were most active and vocal were those who
had the longest-term stake in the corporation;
• most stockholders invested because they liked the companies and
their management, and did not interfere in their strategic direction;
• certain wealthy investors had so much money that they could,
without harm to society, invest in opaque vehicles on a caveat
emptor basis, that was denied to less affluent investors;
3. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite?: A Flesh and Blood
Perspective On Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System, 126
YALE L. J. 1870, 1871-72 (2017) [hereinafter Strine, Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite?].

4

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW
•
•
•
•
•

[Vol. 24:1

workers depended largely on pension funds and social security for
their retirements, and did not form a large segment of the investor
class;
most public companies had long-term lenders, who had a deep
relationship with the company and kept a sharp eye on the
company’s ability to pay its debt and weather tough times;
when corporations became more profitable, they tended to create
more jobs, pay workers better, and give back to their communities
of operation;
corporations had a national, and often regional, focus, and their
managers, directors, employees, lenders, and even stockholders
often had ties of loyalty to those communities; and, finally,
corporate managers were well but not lavishly paid, a plan of internal
succession was common, and corporate managers tended to live in
the community where the corporation was headquartered and be
engaged in community affairs.

In recent decades, these assumptions have been undermined and often
turned upside down:
• corporate stockholder bases turn over rapidly;
• most stock is owned by institutional investors, but represents the
capital of largely silent human investors, and many of these
institutional investors engage in much greater portfolio turnover;
• the actual human investors whose capital is ultimately at stake are
largely bystanders and do not vote;
• the most vocal and active stockholders tend to have investment
strategies most in tension with the efficient market hypothesis, and
often involve hedge funds who only became stockholders after
deciding to change the company and who have no prior or long-term
interest in the company’s well-being;
• Even institutional investors who represent diversified workerinvestors, such as index funds, have pushed manage to the market
policies and for companies to put immediate returns first, even if that
involves harm to other stakeholders;
• The growth of hedge funds and private equity funds has been fueled
not primarily by rich individual investors who bear the risk of losses
themselves, but by other institutional investors like pension funds,
charities, university endowments, and other institutions whose
soundness is important to ordinary Americans and society as a
whole;
• The voice of lenders as a stabilizing and risk reducing factor has
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declined as corporate debt has been securitized, but without any
corresponding increase in stewardship on the part of mutual funds
and others who represent the investors who hold the risk of
insolvency or downgrades;
the tie between increasing corporate prosperity and the best interests
of corporate workers has been sharply eroded, with corporations not
sharing productivity gains with workers and instead, at the behest of
market pressures, focusing on offshoring and job and wage cuts as
methods to increase profits;
corporations increasingly have no national, much less community,
identity and are willing to not only arbitrage their communities
against each other, but also to abandon their national identity for tax
savings; and, finally,
top corporate managers have been promised pay packages way out
of line with other managers, but in exchange must focus intently on
stock price growth and be willing to treat other corporate
constituencies callously if that is necessary to please the stock
market’s short-term wishes (and reap their personal rewards).

Under this radically different system, human investors are not citizens
of the corporate governance republic, they are the voiceless and choiceless
many whose economic prospects turn on power struggles among the classes
of haves — institutional investors — who directly control the stock of the
companies upon which our nation depends for its continued prosperity.
Attention to this institutional investor sector lagged well beyond its power.
Old tropes — such as stockholders good and management bad —
persisted despite the change in identity of who stockholders were. The focus
of academics, the business media, and, ironically, democrats tended to be on
what bad managers were not doing for either stockholders, society, or
stakeholders with little attention on the increased pressures public companies
were facing from institutional investors. The obsession with agency costs
that infatuated key academics like Lucian Bebchuk and Dan Fischel about
company managers did not catch their fancy as to institutional investors.4
4. In fairness to Professor Bebchuk, he has written some articles that could be
considered to address the agency costs of institutional investors. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk
& Scott Hirst, The Specter of the Giant Three, 99 B. U. L. REV. 721 (2019); Lucian A.
Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Scott Hirst, The Agency Problems of Institutional Investors, 31 J.
ECON. PERSP. 89 (2017). But, the bottom line is that Professor Bebchuk does so mostly to
support his argument that mainstream institutional investors are not pushing public companies
to manage to the market strongly enough, and thus that policy makers should not regulate the
activities of activists, even to require more timely disclosure. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk
& Roberto Tallarita, The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance, 105 CORNELL L. REV.
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The assumption among many academics associated with the law and
economics movement, despite their protestations to the contrary when things
went wrong, was that ECMH meant that whatever increases the current stock
price is optimal, that the market will price any externality risk, and that if
there is any harm, that is government’s responsibility. In focusing on
individual companies, they ignored the fact that most investors are long the
economy, not one company, and that the sum total of externalities at specific
companies and downward pressures on wages was less money for working
investors to save, more economic insecurity, more taxes to pay, and more
environmental and public health harm.
That institutional investors voted all their funds in one way did not
bother them, even though funds had very different objectives. That
retirement investors got the same voting policies as quarter-to-quarter day
traders did not matter.
Admittedly, some, including me, harbored some hope that greater
institutional investor/pension power could have some positive benefits.
Perhaps:
• mutual and pension funds would put up directors as owner-directors,
given that many of the funds — i.e., index funds — were stuck in
long term;5
• funds with long-term horizons would align voting policies to the
long-term nature of their investments;

(Forthcoming 2020)
The business corporation has proven itself to be a powerful and adaptive
mechanism for producing economic growth and prosperity. As a result, some of
those who wish to protect stakeholders might be attracted to stakeholderism as a
way to do so by harnessing corporate power through private action and without
resort to costly regulation. However, the past success of corporations has been
based on the presence of effective incentives for corporate decision-makers.
Therefore, with corporate leaders having incentives not to benefit stakeholders at
shareholders’ expense, delegating the guardianship of stakeholder interests to
corporate leaders would prove futile. The promise of pluralistic stakeholderism,
we conclude, is illusory.
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., The Law and Economics of Blockholder
Disclosure, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 40 (2012) (arguing that the SEC should not adopt new rules
that would enhance the disclosure required of stockholders taking a large and active stake in
public companies).
5. See William B. Chandler III & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The New Federalism of the
American Corporate Governance System: Preliminary Reflections of Two Residents of One
Small State, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 953, 993-96 (2003); see also generally Ronald J. Gilson &
Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors,
43 STAN. L. REV. 863, 905 (1991).
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funds would monitor and check excessive management pay;6
funds would focus on seating directors who added business value;
funds would prosecute representative litigation actions that were
legitimate, seek real relief for stockholders, and discourage suits that
only had value for the lawyers involved;7
funds would push corporate governance policies that optimally
balanced efficiency and accountability, taking into account their
own limitations in terms of stewardship capacity;
mainstream funds would referee and fairly decide disputes between
activists and management, and ensure that activist plays were only
supported when they made long-term business sense, and were not
just short-term financial engineering.8

What we got instead was less edifying and can be fairly summarized as
pushing companies to respond to shifting whims of the stock market and to
become corporate Californias where constant stockholder plebiscites put
pressure on company managers to squeeze other stakeholders, lever up, and
engage in constant rounds of stock buybacks, acquisitions or divestures
(whatever is pleasing in the moment in the market). Certain segments of the
pension fund space also seemed to just enjoy being players, and fomented
proposals and meritless litigation.
Thus ensued:
• Paying CEOs with options and other forms of equity tied to total
stock return;
• Ending classified boards;
• Turning withhold votes into pressure tools;
• Insisting on annual Say on Pay votes as a pressure tool, not a
reasoned input on sensible, long-term pay plans focused on
sustainable growth;
• Spicing up the board ISS voting policies that made it easy for
activists to gain board seats;
• Voting index funds and socially responsible funds in line with active
funds to save money;

6. This was the obvious hope behind mandated Say on Pay. Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §951, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §78n-1).
7. This was the obvious hope of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
(“PSLRA”), Pub. L. 104-67, 109 Stat. 373 (codified at various section of 15 U.S.C.).
8. E.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism:
Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 89799 (2013).
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Pressuring companies to cut worker pay and offshore jobs;
Pressuring companies to operate without prudent reserves to permit
as much capital as possible be returned to stockholders;
Ignoring that these pressures for immediate returns were
encouraging companies to pollute our politics to secure regulatory
advantages and externalize risks;
Supporting inversions of American companies to tax havens with
less protective corporate governance;
Failing to focus on risk management structures or financial prudence
at companies, but instead obsessing over immediate returns and
access to sell-side premiums in M&A;
Proliferating representative litigation that did not produce any
benefits for stockholders or companies, but just for the plaintiffs’
lawyers involved, their favored political candidates, and their friends
who served on the staffs of certain public pension funds.

What has resulted from the use of institutional investor muscle in this
manner?
• Growing inequality as a result of a profound shift in gain sharing at
the expense of workers;9
9. An important new paper by Professors Summers and Stansbury illustrates the effect
that increased institutional investor and stockholder power and decreased protection for
worker has had on American inequality. Anna Stansbury & Lawrence H. Summers, The
Declining Worker Power Hypothesis: An Explanation for the Recent Evolution of the
American Economy (NBER Working Paper 27193), https://www.nber.org/papers/w27193 [ht
tps://perma.cc/THE2-QXZS]. Their paper confirms the important work done by Lawrence
Mishel of the Economic Policy Institute over many years. See e.g., Lawrence Mishel, The
Decline in Unions Has Hurt Nonunion Workers Too, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Sept. 1, 2016).;
Lawrence Mishel & Jori Kandra, CEO Compensation Surged 14% in 2019 to $21.3 million,
ECON. POL’Y INST. (Aug. 18, 2020) (observing that as stockholders have tied CEO pay to
stock returns, CEO compensation has increased while worker wages have stagnated);
Lawrence Mishel, Lynn Rhinehart & Lane Windham, Explaining The Erosion of PrivateSector Unions, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Oct. 7, 2020), https://files.epi.org/pdf/211305.pdf [https:
//perma.cc/2K24-PQ88]; Josh Bivens, Lawrence Mishel & John Schmitt, It’s Not Just
Monopoly and Monopsony: How Market Power Has Affected American Wages, ECON. POL’Y
INST. (Apr. 25, 2018), https://files.epi.org/pdf/145564.pdf [https://perma.cc/TP32-J2QB]; see
also Andy Green, Christian E. Weller & Malkie Wall, Corporate Governance and Workers,
CTR. AM. PROGRESS (Aug. 14, 2019), https://www.americanprogress.org/article/corporategovernance-workers/ [https://perma.cc/PXV5-JYAX]; Lenore Palladino, Corporate
Financialization Hurts Jobs and Wages, ROOSEVELT INST. (Sept. 27, 2017), https://roosevel
tinstitute.org/2017/09/27/corporate-financialization-hurts-jobs-and-wages/ [https://perma.cc/
VR45-LEHL]; And, a new report from the European Commission warns that moves toward
similar power dynamics in the EU in this century are starting to manifest themselves in
growing inequality and stagnant wages in Europe. European Commission, Study on
Directors’ Duties and Sustainable Corporate Governance, (July 2020), https://op.europa.
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Resulting economic insecurity and opportunities to exploit this
insecurity through divisive and immoral racial and ethnic appeals;
Exacerbating, not closing, the racial inequality gap because black
people only gained labor rights recently and are more likely to be
working and lower middle class;
Corporate influence over regulation and the political process
generally grew, with the result that protections for stakeholders and
the environment were eroded, and important developments like
climate change were not addressed effectively;10
The need to repeatedly bail out Wall Street and the financial sector,
which has reaped the gains of excessive risk while shifting the costs
to the American public;
A corporate America that lacked resiliency in face of emergencies
because of inadequate reserves, and supply chains built on the cheap
rather than on the basis of quality and reliability, as illustrated by the
need for companies to lay off workers so soon in the face of the
pandemic despite ten years of recovery and a massive corporate tax
cut and by our failure to produce needed supplies in a timely manner;
and
A wave of wasteful litigation that cost companies money that could
have been more productively used to pay workers or invest in future
growth.11

To be fair, the institutional investor community now bemoans some of
these realities.
In recent years, important voices have emerged
acknowledging that diversified, human investors need companies that
produce sustainable wealth, respect the environment, and treat stakeholders

eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/e47928a2-d20b-11ea-adf7-01aa75ed71a1/language-en
[https://perma.cc/92Y5-5BVA].
10. John C. Coates, IV, Corporate Speech & The First Amendment: History, Data and
Implications, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 223, 224 (arguing that corporate influence “risks the loss
of a republican form of government” or as Coates terms it, “the risk of Russia”); see also Leo
E. Strine, Jr., Corporate Power Ratchet: The Courts’ Role in Eroding “We the People’s”
Ability to Constrain Our Corporate Creations, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 423 (2016).
11. Strine, Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite?, supra note 3, 1912-13 (gathering sources
showing that much of the litigation brought by institutional investors resulted in settlements
of no meaningful value to investors); Quinn Curtis & John Morley, Taking Exit Rights
Seriously: Why Governance and Fee Litigation Don’t Work in Mutual Funds, 120 YALE L. J.
84, 117-18 (2010); Donald C. Langevoort, Private Litigation To Enforce Fiduciary Duties in
Mutual Funds: Derivative Suits, Disinterested Directors and the Ideology of Investor
Sovereignty, 83 WASH. U. L. Q. 1017, 1032 (2005); Eric D. Roiter, Disentangling Mutual
Fund Governance from Corporate Governance, 6 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1, 13-17 (2016).
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well,12 and institutional investors have started to echo them.13 Human

12. The Business and Society program at the Aspen Institute and B Lab have been in the
vanguard of this movement and, of course, Marty Lipton has long been a full-throated voice
for stakeholder governance. See American Prosperity Project: A Nonpartisan Framework for
Long-Term Growth, ASPEN INST. (Dec. 2016), https://assets.aspeninstitute.org/content/uploa
ds/2017/01/American-Prosperity-Project_Policy-Framework_FINAL-1.3.17.pdf?_ga=2.171
024224.1135763021.1603475164-1326506324.1603475164 [https://perma.cc/543R-AEDR]
; Overcoming Short-Termism: A Call for a More Responsible Approach to Investment and
Business Management, ASPEN INST. (Sept. 9, 2009), https://assets.aspeninstitute.org/content
/uploads/files/content/docs/pubs/overcome_short_state0909_0.pdf?_ga=2.109117125.11357
63021.1603475164-1326506324.1603475164 [https://perma.cc/UH9F-8Z4P]; Frederick
Alexander, et. al., From Shareholder Primacy to Stakeholder Capitalism: A Policy Agenda
for Systems Change, B Lab (Sept. 7, 2020), https://bcorporation.net/stakeholder-capitalism
[https://perma.cc/8KYX-4ZC2]; Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom, 35
BUS. LAW. 101 (1979). For instance, Senator Warren’s Accountable Capitalism Act would
essentially require that every American business with over $1 billion in sales become like a
Delaware public benefit corporation and have a duty to “manage or direct the business and
affairs of the . . . corporation in a manner that seeks to create a general public benefit and
balances the pecuniary interests of the shareholders of the . . . corporation with the best
interests of persons that are materially affected by the conduct of the . . . corporation.”
Accountable Capitalism Act, S.3348 (115th Cong.), https://www.congress.gov/bill/115thcongress/senate-bill/3348 [https://perma.cc/7UZN-PNF9]; see also 8 Del. C. § 365
The board of directors [of a Delaware public benefit corporation] shall manage
or direct the business and affairs of the public benefit corporation in a manner
that balances the pecuniary interests of the stockholders, the best interests of those
materially affected by the corporation’s conduct, and the specific public benefit
or public benefits identified in its certificate of incorporation.
And the BRT issued a revised statement on corporate governance moving in this direction in
2019. Statement on Corporate Purpose, BUS. ROUNDTABLE (Aug. 19, 2019), https://opport
unity.businessroundtable.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/03/BRT-Statement-on-the-Purpose-of
-a-Corporation-with-Signatures.pdf [https://perma.cc/UL4B-Q2AB].
Likewise, other
thought leaders have called for corporate governance reform to require corporations to give
more weight to sustainable, ethical growth and more consideration to corporate stakeholders,
like workers, and not just stockholders. See, e.g. Marc Benioff, We Need a New Capitalism,
N.Y. TIMES, (Oct. 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/14/opinion/benioff-salesfor
ce-capitalism.html [https://perma.cc/NTB7-Y2J9]; Lynn Stout, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE
MYTH (2012); Lenore Palladino, The Economic Argument for Stakeholder Corporations,
ROOSEVELT INST., (June 2019), https://rooseveltinstitute.org/publications/economic-argume
nt-for-stakeholder-corporations/ [https://perma.cc/8M33-F4NU]; Judith F. Samuelson, Did
the Business Roundtable Sound the Death Knell for Shareholder Primary?, ASPEN INST.,
(Aug. 26, 2019), https://www.aspeninstitute.org/blog-posts/didthe-business-roundtable-soun
d-the-death-knell-for-shareholder-primacy/ [https://perma.cc/89Q3-JCNX]; COLIN MAYER,
PROSPERITY: BETTER BUSINESS MAKES THE GREATER GOOD (2018); FREDRICK H.
ALEXANDER, BENEFIT CORPORATION LAW AND GOVERNANCE (2017).
13. Larry Fink, A Sense of Purpose: Larry Fink’s 2018 Letter to CEOs, BLACKROCK,
https://www.BlackRock.com/corporate/investor-relations/2018-larry-fink-ceo-letter [https://
perma.cc/682M-BMCT] (“To prosper over time, every company must not only deliver
financial performance, but also show how it makes a positive contribution to society.”); John
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investors themselves are becoming more long-term oriented and rational, and
gravitating toward index funds.14 Admirably, some, like State Street, are
even stepping up to constrain corporate political spending that is often at
odds with the interests of stakeholders,15 and to vote for reasonable forum
selection provisions to constrain rent-seeking by the plaintiffs’ bar.16 And
grudgingly, the reality that most American investors depend on quality jobs
for their ability to invest is being acknowledged, and with the events of this
year shining a light on racial inequality that they cannot blind themselves
to,17 these institutions are now voicing a concern not just about gender
inclusion, but finally also admitting the need to address how our nation has
mistreated black people.18 But there is a problem. Most of this rhetoric

C. Bogle, Bogle Sounds a Warning on Index Funds, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 29, 2018); State Street
Institution U.S. Equity Fund, Prospectus, (Jan. 31, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edg
ar/data/0001040061/000119312518028506/d533731d497.htm [https://perma.cc/6KRT-DDP
D] (“Well-developed environmental and social management systems generate efficiencies
and enhance productivity, both of which impact shareholder value in the long-term.”);
Vanguard, Policies and Guidelines Environmental and Social Matters (2018), https://web.ar
chive.org/web/20180224173653/https://about.vanguard.com/investment-stewardship/policie
s-and-guidelines/ (“[W]e believe our approach strikes the appropriate balance between
corporate responsibility and our fiduciary obligations.”).
14. See, e.g., John C. Coates, IV, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I: The
Problem of Twelve (Working Paper, Mar. 14, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract_id=3247337 [https://perma.cc/DR2J-B8RS]; Lucian A. Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, The
Specter of the Giant Three, 99 B.U. L. REV. 721,727 (2019) (documenting the growth of index
funds and their rising popularity with investors).
15. Bruce Freed & Dan Carroll, Mutual Fund Support for Corporate Political Disclosure
Continues Steady Rise, CTR. POL. ACCOUNTABILITY (Dec. 17, 2019) (“Going against this
trend were the Big Three institutional investors – BlackRock, Vanguard and Fidelity – which
continued to oppose the Center’s political disclosure resolution. In contrast, the other
institutional investor behemoth, State Street, increased its support over last year.”).
16. See Proposed ISS Benchmark Policy Changes for 2021, INST. S’HOLDER SERV’S,
https://www.issgovernance.com/file/policy/proposed-benchmark-policy-changes-2021.pdf [
https://perma.cc/4PT2-AZXV] (proposing to modify ISS’s guidelines to generally
recommend approval of forum selection clauses in corporate bylaws).
17. For an excellent overview of how the coronavirus pandemic has further exposed our
economy’s severe racial inequality, see Elise Gould & Valerie Wilson, Black Works Face
Two of the Most Lethal Preexisting Conditions—Racism and Economic Inequality, ECON.
POL’Y INST. (June 1, 2020), https://www.epi.org/publication/black-workers-covid [https://pe
rma.cc/V7LA-RXQE].
18. See, e.g., Blackrock, Our Actions to Advance Racial Equity and Inclusion (June 22,
2020), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/about-us/social-impact/advancing-racial-equity
[https://perma.cc/6VRZ-F8J9]
While we are still refining our efforts and goals, our focus is on . . . [p]romoting
workforce and leadership diversity by engaging with and seeking reporting by
the companies in which we invest. . . . We also will continue to emphasize the
importance of diversity in the board room, considering personal characteristics
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remains that, rhetoric, and even more, most of it is directed at companies,
and does not involve self-reflection.
Most of all, it does not yet involve acknowledging that money
managers’ success in making American public companies playthings of the
stock market was a substantial cause of these suboptimal outcomes for our
nation and its citizens.
II.

THE REASONS WHY THE GOVERNMENT MUST PLAY A ROLE

We are thus at a moment too common in our history. Substantial
inequities have led to calls for action to provide greater fairness and
opportunity for the many, in part by checking excesses of the privileged few.
At these times, the privileged often say — our bad, sorry, we’ve got it now
— leave it to us. For corporate scholars, the Merrick Dodd response.
But when a powerful interest has had generations to “get it,” the public
should be rightly skeptical. Had the interest gotten it, things would not be
the way they are. And for realists, poor outcomes are not usually evidence
that the privileged are bad people, but that the rules of the game are not well
tailored, thus promoting movement toward the worst angels of our nature.
Realists demand effective external constraints promoting socially
responsible conduct. For corporate scholars, the Adolph Berle approach.
I am firmly of the good Adolph school and believe that we are in the
current predicament because of our failure to remember the lessons of history
and to address new phenomenon to ensure that they are not exploited to
unbalance the New Deal/social democratic consensus that saved us from
fascism and communism, and provided a sound framework for a fair market
economy.19 As applied to the institutional investor segment, there is even
more reason to believe that government action to address new market
dynamics and their effects on society are long overdue.
For starters, it is striking how much pressure there has been for
government action to regulate public companies that make real products and
deliver real services,20 when the market checks on public companies are so

like gender, as well as race and ethnicity, in addition to professional experience.
Saijel Kishen, State Street to Press Companies on Boasting Racial Diversity, BLOOMBERG
(Aug. 27, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-08-27/state-street-to-presscompanies-on-boosting-racial-diversity [https://perma.cc/X45T-NXGJ].
19. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Made for this Moment: The Enduring Relevance of Adolf Berle’s
Belief in a Global New Deal, 42 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 267 (2019).
20. Consider, for example, the provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat.
745 (July 30, 2002), and Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (July 21, 2010), almost
all of which addressed operating companies, without addressing in any meaningful way the

2021]

STEWARDSHIP 2021

13

much more substantial than those faced by institutional investors.
Distinguished friends of mine like Lucian Bebchuk have long bemoaned that
there are not enough proxy contests, hostile takeover attempts, and derivative
suits against public company boards. For that reason, they have argued that
government should change the rules of the game to facilitate direct
democracy at public companies, incent CEOs to manage to the market,
require certain board committees, and other important measures — such as
disclosure policies — to channel corporate behavior in the direction they
favor.21 They do so because they argue that the old Wall Street rule — exit
to another company in the Russell 3000 — or the potent tools stockholders
have under state law, are not enough. No, much more must always be done
to check the excessive “agency costs” of public company managers and
directors.
But, for some reason, these manage to the market advocates never apply
the same thinking to institutional investors. For workers lucky enough to
have a pension, they have no rights to replace their trustees or exit, they must
depend on the prudence of their trustees, and suits against such trustees are
far less common than suits against public companies. For 401(k) workerinvestors, the Wall Street rule is far less helpful, because they are stuck with
moving from one fund to another in the fund families chosen by their
employer and their money is stuck in until age 60. Mutual fund proxy fights
and derivative suits are rarer than sashimi. Furthermore, the existing
governmental regime is much more outdated than the Delaware General
Corporation Law or even the federal securities laws, and involve at best an
adequate 1970’s-relevant governance regime confronting an industry that
has grown in complexity and sophistication far more rapidly than almost any
segment of the economy, except perhaps tech, since that time.
Key developments — such as intermediaries like charities, university
endowments, and pension funds putting the public at risk by investing in
opaque hedge funds without track record information or knowing what
special deals are being cut with more favored investors — the rise of
synthetics and derivatives and their important effects — the changes in how
corporations use debt capital and their implications for the relative voice of
institutional investors whose pressures inflated the balloon of bubble capitalism.
21. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Can We Do Better By Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic Reaction
To The Dueling Ideological Mythologists Of Corporate Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 449 (2014);
Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward a True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist Response to Bebchuk’s
Solution for Improving Corporate America, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1759 (2006) (both discussing
Professor Bebchuk’s support for direct democracy at American corporations, and his view
that stockholders have too little influence); see also generally, Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth
That Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1637 (2013); Lucian
A. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833 (2005).
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equity and debt capital — the interaction of demands for mutual funds to act
as stewards and the cost constraints they are under to compete with each
other — the payment of money managers on horizons that do not match that
of their underlying investors — have not been factored adequately into
regulatory action. On many fronts, no action has been taken at all. On others,
it has been done with a blinkered view of the full implications.
The overall effect of this inaction is clear: virtually all institutional
investor sectors have pushed management to the market policies. The sectors
combine to pressure public companies to favor immediate returns to
stockholders as the first priority of corporate governance, to push
corporations to minimize reserves, restrict worker pay, offshore and cut jobs,
take on more risk, and to be open at all times to sale. In response,
corporations have done all these things, and have also acted on the political
process to make it easier for them to please stockholders, by externalizing
risk to society and other stakeholders. Corporations have used treasury funds
and other resources to seat candidates and to lobby for policies that undercut
unions, wages, climate change response, consumer protection, and help
industries externalize their costs to society.
The bottom line is when one arrow goes way up — stockholder power
— and one other goes way down — stakeholder voice and power, in
particular that of workers — the more powerful interest wins. This has been
vividly illustrated in the returns to stockholders and those paid to serve them
— top executives whose pay is tied to total stock return — in comparison to
American workers. This is not about the pie not growing. There has been
plenty o’ new pie. It is about the have’s taking a much bigger share of the
pie.
Similar power imbalances have resulted in the failure to address climate
change, opioids, financial risk-taking by the banking sector, the
anticompetitive effects of big tech, and shifts in risk from the wealthy
investor class and the companies that caused these externalities to the public,
in the form of recessions, unemployment, huge bailouts, and public health
and consumer harm. The overall cost of these externalities is a drag on
overall economic efficiency, a cost borne by real working investors who own
the whole economy.
That this phenomenon involves hurting the economic interests of
pension and 401k investors — who depend on quality jobs for their wealth
and ability to save for retirement, are dependent on the whole economy, and
who pay for externalities as taxpayers, air breathers and water drinkers, and
consumers — has for far too long been ignored by institutional investors.22

22. In a prior paper, I gathered the economic evidence that shows how much Americans

2021]

STEWARDSHIP 2021

15

Their recent recognition of what their human investors actually need is
welcome but remains blinkered. Rather than accept responsibility for
themselves, they continue to mostly externalize responsibility by urging
public companies to do better to protect stakeholders and the environment.
But, that is not stewardship in its fullest sense. That is shirking.
What stewardship involves is accepting your own fiduciary
responsibility to align your behavior with the legitimate interests of those
you are charged with protecting.
It’s good to call on companies to address climate change. But can they
do so unless you show, not by words, but deeds that you support them in
doing so?
It’s useful to call on companies to address racial inequality and growing
economic insecurity. But can they do so unless you recognize that the best
way for companies to help close these gaps is to pay their workers more,
because this will disproportionately benefit black people and all suffering
economic insecurity? If you do not support companies in giving fair wage
increases and putting worker well-being first in recessions, how can
companies do so?
It’s helpful to call for more equality and diversity at companies, but do
you mean it? Was the failure to consider racial diversity until the murder of
George Floyd a signal that the prior focus on just gender diversity was a
marketing strategy? And are you going to follow up and actually focus on
racial equality in reality or just in words?
It’s understandable that you react when there is an environmental
catastrophe, such as an oil spill, a consumer injury, such as opioids or a data
breach, that hits the stock price hard and causes public outrage, but do you
use your voting power to focus on whether companies have effective risk
management structures at both the management and board level? Or do you
just pressure them to manage to the market and then opportunistically
complain when something goes wrong, so that you are not exposed to
criticism for supporting industry policies that put stockholders’ demand for
immediate returns over fairness to society?
Do you call for woke company policies but abdicate in considering
whether companies are using investors’ money to elect candidates and lobby
for policies that undercut causes like racial fairness, worker fair pay and
safety, and environmental responsibility?
depend on their access to a good job and wages for their wealth. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who
Bleeds When the Wolves Bite? supra note 3, at 1876-1882 (2017). In that same piece, I also
cited evidence that black Americans were far less likely to have retirement savings and when
they had them, they were at much lower levels than white Americans. Strine, Who Bleeds
When the Wolves Bite?, supra note 3, at 1882.
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Put bluntly, there is a large gap between what even high-minded
institutions are asking of companies and what they are asking of themselves.
Ultimately public companies cannot treat their workers, consumers,
taxpayers, communities, and the environment more fairly than their investors
will support.23 If investors talk woke in public, but obsess over TSR and
buybacks in private meetings and in voting their shares, TSR and buybacks
will win out.
For these and other reasons I don’t have time to discuss, effective
stewardship must involve government regulation that requires all
institutional investors with power in our society to use it responsibly. This
is also essential to help those trying to do it right become the industry
standard, because it will prevent them from continuing to be undercut by
competitors who use their own failure to be good stewards as a chance to
compete on cut rate pricing and short-term returns.
III.

INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR REFORM: AN ESSENTIAL BUT NOT
SUFFICIENT CONDITION OF A 21ST CENTURY NEW DEAL

Before setting forth what reforms might foster greater stewardship and
positive social impact by institutional investors, I underscore the obvious.
Institutional investor reform alone cannot restore fairness to our economy.
Reforms to increase the wages and voice of labor, protect consumers, tackle
climate change, and invest in basic research and infrastructure are
indispensable, as are moves to make the rights of workers and the protection
of the environment central to the international trading regime.24 And of
course, companies themselves, and large private companies, must be
required to give greater consideration to sustainable growth, fair treatment
of workers and other stakeholders, and environmental responsibility. But
although stewardship-promoting regulation of institutional investors alone is
not adequate, it is essential.
Unless the powerful interests that control the voting of public
companies are required to align their conduct with the needs of the human
23. Rebecca Henderson, What Would It Take To Get Businesses To Focus Less on
Shareholder Value? HARV. BUS. REV. (Aug. 21, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/08/what-wouldit-take-to-get-businesses-to-focus-less-on-shareholder-value [https://perma.cc/32QT-FPEJ]
(noting that it is not corporate law, but the power dynamics and stock market pressure under
which public companies operate that make it difficult for them not to focus on immediate
returns to stockholders as the priority, rather than more responsible, sustainable approaches
to long-term growth).
24. For my own ideas along these lines, see Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward Fair and
Sustainable Capitalism, ROOSEVELT INSTITUTE (Aug. 2020), https://rooseveltinstitute.org/p
ublications/toward-fair-and-sustainable-capitalism/ [https://perma.cc/62EC-Q246].
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beings they serve, public companies and our economy will not be able to do
so. Pretending otherwise is naïve and injurious to economic security and
fairness.
For that reason, any 21st Century New Deal must include bold action
to update the regulatory structure within which institutional investors
operate. That involves requiring all the key sectors — mutual funds, pension
funds, and hedge funds — to accept their responsibility as faithful
fiduciaries, or in the parlance of this conference, as good stewards. And it
involves a variety of techniques, such as requirements for institutional
investors to align their use of power with the interests of their human clients
and society, and to make fairer disclosure about their behavior and interests.
Key steps to encourage more alignment toward sustainable returns, fair
treatment of workers, and environmental responsibility should include:
• Requiring institutional investors to consider—as part of the
fiduciary duties they owe to their clients—their ultimate
beneficiaries’ investment objectives and horizons, such as saving for
retirement or education, and require institutional investors to
consider their ultimate beneficiaries’ economic and human interest
in having companies create quality jobs and act responsibly toward
their consumers and the environment as part of their decisionmaking process.
• Specifically, institutional investors who take human investors’
money, including mutual funds and pension funds, should be
required to consider the investment objectives and horizons of their
ultimate beneficiaries, such as saving for retirement, saving for their
children’s education, or investing in a socially responsible manner,
when making voting and other stewardship decisions. Specific
obligations would be imposed on index and pension funds to
consider their investors’ interests in sustainable, long-term growth
and the diversified nature of their portfolios.25 In particular, that
would require index funds and other funds that hold a broad swath
of the economy, to recognize their fiduciary duty to support
governance policies that foster overall economic growth and
minimize externalities, thus fostering the most sustainable portfolio

25. This would, for example, have the effect of promoting voting on key issues — such
as a public company’s desire to become a public benefit corporation — that aligns the interests
of investors in sustainable wealth creation with company-level corporate governance that does
the same thing. And by these means, the relative influence of those institutional investors,
such as index funds, pension funds, and socially responsible funds, will grow, providing for
more balance and a greater focus on responsible, durable wealth creation than is currently the
case.
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and overall wealth creation for their investors.26
Prohibiting institutional investors from relying on proxy advisory
firms unless the proxy advisor’s recommendations are tailored to the
fund’s investment style and horizon. This would create incentives
for proxy advisory firms to do better, and encourage them to develop
voting recommendations and policies tailored to index investors,
who depend on economy-wide, sustainable wealth creation.
Requiring all institutional investors to consider their ultimate
beneficiaries’ overall economic and human welfare, in determining
how to prudently invest their funds for sustainable, ethical portfolio
growth. This plain authorization for all investment funds to consider
EESG factors will eliminate any fear, heightened by the Trump
Administration DOL’s recent actions, that any institutional investor
cannot take into account the moral and ethical factors that human
investors can consider. Notably, the United Kingdom has already
embraced the idea that institutional investors should factor in the real
world effects of important EESG issues on their human investors
into its stewardship policies, which were updated in 2020 to make
this plain.27
Requiring institutional investors to disclose how their voting
policies and other stewardship practices ensure the faithful discharge
of their new fiduciary duties and take into account information
reported by large companies on employee, environmental, social,
and governance matters. If we want operating companies to act in a
sustainable and ethical fashion, then institutional investors must
make consideration of key EESG issues a central factor in their
approach to stewardship and their investors and the public deserve
information to determine if they are doing so. This requirement
should parallel new EESG disclosure obligations that should be
imposed on all large companies, private or public, but be shorter in
length and focused on how institutions factor these issues into their
stewardship decisions.
Requiring institutional investors to align their voting on corporate

26. Cf. Rebecca Henderson, Shareholder Value in a Burning World, PROJECT
SYNDICATE (Oct. 1, 2020), https://www.project-syndicate.org/onpoint/shareholder-value-cor
porations-and-climate-change-by-rebecca-henderson-2020-10?barrier=accesspaylog [https://
perma.cc/R5D3-ADNF] (“At the level of the entire economic system, there is no fundamental
incompatibility between maximizing profits and addressing climate change. But there is a
massive collective action problem . . . .”).
27. See The UK FRC Stewardship Code 2020 available at https://www.frc.org.uk/getatta
chment/5aae591d-d9d3-4cf4-814a-d14e156a1d87/Stewardship-Code_Dec-19-Final-Correct
ed.pdf [https://perma.cc/4CHW-V49S].
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governance policies, such as the frequency of say on pay votes, with
their EESG policies and their own stewardship capacity: Currently,
institutional investors support more votes on everything, even when
they realize that they cannot focus on all of them. This is evidenced
by annual SOP votes, where proxy advisors are the key determinants
of outcomes, because there are too many votes for thoughtful
consideration. Real stewardship demands ensuring that investors
and society are not hurt by making companies spend scarce
resources on votes that institutional investors cannot responsibly
consider and by using votes on specific issues as a sideways tool to
express discontent in a bad year, rather than to give reasoned input
on the company’s strategic approach.
Requiring a certain level of stewardship by all institutional investors:
My friends Professors Bebchuk and Lund are not wrong that the
leading index funds do not have enough stewardship resources to
adequately consider all the votes that occur. That is why fewer, more
meaningful, votes should occur. But another problem must be
addressed: the big index funds do way better than most. If we are
going to encourage institutions to vote, then all of them must be
expected to invest in stewardship, so that perverse pricing pressures
do not inhibit stewardship. Absent a return to the Wall Street rule,
an industry-wide expectation of stewardship is essential, so that
those trying to do things right are not undercut by free-riders and the
benefits of greater alignment are lost.
Requiring investment funds invested in corporate debt securities to
develop and act on stewardship policies to protect investors, reduce
excessive corporate risk, and provide needed balance to our
corporate governance system: In the last two generations,
institutional investors managing equity funds have been pressured to
use their voice, and this has manifested itself in a tilt toward
stockholders at the expense of other stakeholders. Evidence exists
that activism largely results in transfers of wealth from stakeholders
like workers and debt holders to equity holders.28 But most human

28. A few years ago, I pulled the then-extant evidence on this topic together. See Strine,
Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite? supra note 3, at 1870(citing scholarly studies coming to
the conclusion that gains from activism to stockholders often involved shifts in wealth to
stockholders from workers and creditors), and was also associated with a decline in research
and development). For a reader interested in a balanced and accessible discussion of the
literature, the following article by Professors Coffee and Palia remains essential. John C.
Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on
Corporate Governance, 41 J. CORP. L. 545 (2016).
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investors do not just invest in equities, they also invest in debt, and
especially in the years when they need their portfolio to pay for
college for their kids or retirement for themselves. As we have
encouraged equity investors to use their voice, we have not required
funds holding debt securities to do the same, and to put in place
stewardship policies that encourage systemic practices that
discourage excessive leverage and risk in American corporations,
and thus protect their investors and in the course of doing so also
help American workers and communities who suffer harm from
avoidable corporate insolvencies caused by risky balance sheet
practices.
Requiring all corporate political spending be under plans approved
by a super-majority of stockholders and that institutional investors
align their voting on political spending with their EESG policies and
ensure that companies do not invest in dark money political action
committees, multi-candidate committees, or in the campaigns of
candidates whose policy views are not consistent with the
company’s stated EESG commitments or the investors’ own
policies. One of the major reasons for the imbalance in power that
now exists is that companies have been able to use their resources to
act on the political process to externalize costs (such as of
environmental compliance or worker safety) to society and
stakeholders like workers, and to undermine regulatory protections
for workers, consumers, and the environment. Institutional
investors, with the exception of certain institutions, have abdicated
on this important subject and must be forced to step up. Investors
do not invest with institutional investors so that their capital can be
deployed by public companies for political purposes.29

29. For a further discussion of my own perspective on these phenomenons, see Leo E.
Strine, Jr., Fiduciary Blind Spot: The Failure of Institutional Investors to Prevent the
Illegitimate Use of Working Americans’ Savings for Corporate Political Spending, 97 WASH.
U. L. REV. 1007 (2020); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Corporate Power Ratchet: The Court’s Role in
Eroding “We The People’s” Ability to Constrain Our Corporate Creations, 51 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 423 (2016). For a recent empirical report demonstrating the use by public
companies to support candidates and committees whose values were inconsistent with stated
company EESG policies, see Conflicted Consequences, CTR. POL. ACCOUNTABILITY (July
21, 2020), https://politicalaccountability.net/hifi/files/Conflicted-Consequences.pdf [https://p
erma.cc/A5FM-M8BH]. Respected scholars have warned that the effect of individual
companies and industries in wielding their wealth to bend regulatory policies to their wills is
more likely to hamper overall economic growth and to reduce social welfare. John C. Coates
IV, Corporate Speech & The First Amendment: History, Data, and Implications, 30 CONST.
COMMENT. 223 (2015); Rebecca Henderson and Karthik Ramanna, Do Managers Have A Role
to Play in Sustaining The Institutions of Capitalism?, 4, 7-14, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, (Feb.
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Requiring pension funds and other investment funds to have all
litigation authorized by the board, not staff, before filing, and to
make a determination that the benefits of the litigation, in terms of
recovering financial losses caused by a potential breach of fiduciary
duty or corporate governance principles, is worth the cost to the fund
and the company’s stakeholders. Likewise, any settlement should
be authorized by the board on the same criteria, and in supporting
any fee, the board should have to determine that the benefit to the
fund’s investors and the other stockholders justifies the fee.

These requirements should be accompanied by voluntary action by
mutual and pension funds to bring their own stewardship practices into closer
alignment with the real interests of their worker-investors. By way of
example, leading mutual funds are now voicing support for sustainable
growth and stakeholder governance. They need to match this rhetoric by a
stated willingness to support public companies that wish to become a public
benefit corporation under Delaware law, and commit themselves to a
mandatory “shall” duty of respect to stakeholders and to sustainable wealth
creation for their stockholders.30 Furthermore, they need to do more to
9, 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/research/do-managers-have-a-role-to-play-in-sustainin
g-the-institutions-of-capitalism/ [https://perma.cc/5MY9-H6D3] (warning of the “real risk
that private sector engagement with the political process will fundamentally distort the
institutions of capitalism and managers have a responsibility to the system itself” and that this
risk is heightened because businesses exert influence on subjects involving “thin political
processes” where countervailing interests are less likely to be effectively represented and
heard).
30. Delaware has now made it possible for an existing public company to convert by a
majority vote. See H.R. 341, 150 Gen. Assemb., (Del. 2020), https://legis.delaware.gov/json
/BillDetail/GenerateHtmlDocument?legislationId=48122&legislationTypeId=1&docTypeId
=2&legislationName=HB341 [https://perma.cc/C4SR-BS6K] (removing the requirement in
§ 363(b) that a two-thirds majority of stockholders is required for a Delaware corporation to
convert to a public benefit corporation). Notably, this year, Lemonade and Vital Farms went
public as benefit corporations with favorable pricing. Form S-1, Lemonade, Inc. (June 8,
2020), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1691421/000104746920003416/a2241721z
s-1.htm [https://perma.cc/KD2Z-7KNP]; Form S-1, Vital Farms, Inc. (July 9, 2020), https://
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1579733/000119312520190455/d841617ds1.htm [https://
perma.cc/8JWR-S8EV]. And, Danone became the French equivalent of a benefit corporation
without adverse effect to its stock price or the price at which its ADRs sell in the U.S. Maitane
Sardon & Cristina Roca, Danone to Place Greater Focus on ESG, WALL ST. J. (May 20,
2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/danone-to-place-greater-focus-on-esg-11590004975 [ht
tps://perma.cc/E4QN-HUWQ]. As scholars have noted, there is reason to believe that
companies, like benefit corporations, that embrace a purpose of making profits in a socially
responsible way that is respectful of all stakeholders cannot only succeed as profitable
businesses, they are likely essential to tackling challenging problems like climate change.
E.g., Rebecca Henderson & George Serafim, Tackling Climate Change Requires
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ensure they have adequate information when activists pressure companies to
take actions with long-term consequences for stuck-in stockholders and
company workers. For starters, that would include refusing to support any
activist that does not: 1) fully disclose its entire ownership position, long,
short or otherwise hedged, in a clear way, revealing its true net long position;
2) disclose the terms of its fund arrangements that bear on how long the
activist can and is likely to hold its shares in the target company; 3) promise
to have one of its representatives serve on the company’s key risk
management committee; and 4) making a binding promise not to exit its
investment in the company on preferential terms and to accept any market
discount that is required of other investors in unwinding their position.31 By
means like this, mainstream investors would understand how truly
committed activists are to living with the long-term consequences of their
own strategy for the company, or whether they are just telling other stuck-in
investors that they will be better off if they listen to the helpful hints of a
momentary visitor in their ranks.32
To fully address the lack of accountability and information about hedge
funds and other private investment funds, however, regulatory action of the
following kind must be taken:
• Close loopholes so that activist hedge funds must make a full and
timely disclosure of their economic interests in the companies they
seek to influence, and bring America’s regulation into line with the
other major market economies.
• To this end, the SEC should revise its rules governing Schedule 13D
disclosure so that: (i) the definition of beneficial ownership includes
ownership of any derivative instrument that provides the opportunity
to profit from an increase in the value of the subject security and any
contract or device that allows the person to control the voting power
Organizational Purpose, AM. ECON. ASS’N Papers and Proceedings, 110: 177-180 (May
2020); see generally, COLIN MAYER, PROSPERITY: BETTER BUSINESS MAKES THE
GREATER GOOD (2018).
31. The empirical evidence is that activist hedge funds typically hold their shares for one
to two years at most, and many for less than a year. Alon Brav et. al, Hedge Fund Activism,
Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, 63 J. FIN. 1729, 1749 (2008); Coffee & Palia,
supra note 28, at 572; Strine, Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite?, supra note 3, at 1892.
32. Others have noted that the compensation structures for fund managers are often short
term in nature, and do not align with their investors’ horizons. Strine, Who Bleeds When the
Wolves Bite?, supra note 3, at 1915- 1917 (compiling studies and commentary to this effect).
Much attention has been paid to CEO pay at public companies and the efforts to “reform” it
to date have been, in my judgement, dismaying in their effect. For that reason, I am reluctant
to tinker in this area for mutual fund managers, but do note that the lack of alignment puts
pressure on managers to focus on results over a time frame that does not match their
investors’, especially those saving for retirement.
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of the equity security; (ii) disclosures of any short interest or
ownership of a derivative instrument that allows the investor to
profit from a decrease in the security’s value are required; (iii) 13D
filers could not acquire additional shares (or derivatives) once the
investor crosses the 5% threshold (for large-cap companies) or a
10% threshold (for smaller companies) until a 13D has been filed
and available to the public for 24 hours; (iv) disclosure is required
of contractual or other arrangements that affect the filer’s
commitment or ability to hold the subject security, including the
ability of the filer’s investors, if any, to redeem or withdrawal their
capital; and (v) a standard form is developed that activists must use
to disclose, in clear understandable terms, their net long position and
keep it updated as that changes by more than one percent in any
direction.
Strengthen the securities laws to make it illegal for activists to tip
others during the period before they file under Section 13(d): There
is abundant evidence of abnormal trading by pack members before
the alpha wolf files makes public disclosure of its stake. This allows
for the possibility of creeping takeovers at the expense of other
stockholders and stakeholders, and is unfair to other traders in the
marketplace. Given the power activists have to move stock prices
just by their presence, they should be prohibited from leaking to
other investors during this period and if they do so and trading
results, they should face liability.33
Address the investor and societal risks caused by private funds that
are subject to only limited disclosure requirements. Although hedge
funds and private equity funds should not be required to disclose
proprietary information about their trading strategies that would
inhibit their ability to conduct their unique approach to investing, it
is long past time when they should be permitted to cloak their track
records, their terms of investment, special deals to their favorites,
and other important information because their investors should be
presumed able to operate on a caveat emptor basis. The accredited
investor and qualified purchaser exceptions were not intended to
allow pension funds, universities, or charitable institutions to put
money in risky investments not backed up by appropriate disclosures
and standards of integrity. But many have been harmed by investing
in private equity and hedge funds without adequate information.

33. See Coffee & Palia supra note 28 at 562-566; see also Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert
J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides? 124 HARV. L. REV. 83 (2010).
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These losses hurt workers and society and can require taxpayers to
fill the resulting holes. Pension funds and charities lack enough
reliable information to prudently assess whether these investments
are appropriate for their portfolio on both a risk-return basis and on
a cost basis. The SEC and Congress should work together to fix this
important problem.
Finally, to promote more thoughtful, rational investing by both human
customers of the institutional investor community, and the institutional
investors themselves, the tax policies affecting the industry should be
reformed. In particular, a financial transactions tax should be adopted that
would not only discourage destabilizing and risky speculative trading
without economic substance, but discourage fund-hopping by mutual fund
investors. Likewise, the long-standing abuse of the carried interest loophole
should be shut, and capital gains for holdings of less than five years should
be taxed like income earned by sweat.
By these means, the incentives for productive investing that is positive
for society will be increased, and the revenues raised in this Pigouvian
manner can help fund clean infrastructure to address climate change and
create quality jobs, basic research to fuel long-term growth and American
competitiveness, and investments in the ongoing training and education of
American workers.
***
None of these reforms will harm the institutional investment industry
in the long term. Rather, they will legitimize an industry whose power has
long outgrown its expected responsibilities. And done in concert with a 21st
Century New Deal to focus our economy on sustainable growth,
environmental responsibility, and, most of all, the fair treatment of the
workers who make capitalism a success, these measures will create a more
equitable and prosperous America, and by doing so, expand the class of
Americans who have the means to invest with the industry for college for
their kids, retirement for themselves, and enjoy genuine economic security.
All that this involves is making sure that a powerful segment of our
economy’s responsibilities be aligned with its power. Put another way, all
that is required is that the have’s do a little for the common good. That is
not much to ask.

